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Chapter Two

A Legal History of
American Roman Catholic Schools
Charles J. Russo

INTRODUCTION
'fheSecond Vatican Council's Declaration on Catholic Education (Gravissi'!"urn Educationis [GE], literally "the Importance of Education") was one of
Its crowning achievements. GE was promulgated in 1965, a time when
A.merican Catholic elementary and secondary schools were at about their
zenith in terms of student enrollments before heading into a steady decline in
Illll11bers of institutions and enrollments.
As could have been expected, GE was consistent with the Church ' s univ.ersal teaching in recognizing education as essentially a fundamental human
nght. Although it was unlikely to have done so intentionally, GE reflects
fi'om a Catholic perspective much the same message as is contained in such
secular international human rights documents as the 1948 Universal DeclarQtion on Human Rights, the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, and
the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
EthniC, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. GE thus recognized the right to
Chtistian- specifically Roman Catholic- education and the authority of parents to make such free choices for their children .
A.ccording to GE, "Parents who have the primary and inalienable right
and duty to educate their children must enjoy true liberty in their choice of
Schools" (GE, 6). The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary (Pierce , 1925), the
JUslices' first case involving religion and education, predated GE by more
than 40 years. In Pierce the Court upheld the rights of parents to direct the
UPbringing of their children, presaging later developments that impacted pos29
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itively on religiously affiliated non-public educational institutions, most notably for this chapter and book, Catholic schools.
Invalidating a law from Oregon that would have obligated parents to send
their children to public schools, the Court reasoned in Pierce that " [t]he child
is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additi onal obligations" (p. 535). In so ruling, the Court recognized
the rights of proprietors of a Roman Catholic school and a secular military
academy to operate, setting the stage for further growth and development of
religiously affiliated non-public elementary and secondary schools, the vast
majority of which were Roman Catholic schools.
As important as Pierce was, especially combined with the role religion
played both in American history and education, the Supreme Court did not
rely on the First Amendment Religion Clauses in the fray over religiously
affiliated non-public schools until 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education
(Everson). Pursuant to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, "Congress shall make no law regarding an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." Everson was a dispute over the costs of transporting chi ldren to their religiously affiliated, mostly Roman Catholic, non-public schools.
Following Everson, the Supreme Court resolved more K-12 cases on
religion under the First Amendment than any other subject involving schooling. It is important to note that insofar as the litigation involving Roman
Catholic schoo ls also impacts other religiously-affiliated non-public schools,
this chapter tends to use the latter term unless a case was initially litigated in
one or primarily involved Catholic institutions.
Decisions of the Supreme Court have shaped the parameters of permissible aid that the Federal and state govenunents can provide to Catholic, and
other faith-based schools. This chapter examines its major decisions. The
chapter focuses largely on Supreme Court cases involving elementary and
secondary education because they served to help effectuate, albeit without
intending to do so, the basic principles proclaimed in GE.

LEGAL PREHISTORY
The 200 Roman Catholic schools in existence in 1860 grew to more than
1,300 in the next decade. Spurred on by the 1884 Third Plenary Council of
Baltimore, which mandated the creation of a parish school near every Catholic Church to serve the rapidly growing immigrant population that was largely Lmwelcome in many public schools, by the turn of the century almost
5,000 Catholic schools operated in the United States (Mahr, 1987). During
this same time, the number of Catholics in the United States rose from
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7,855,000 in 1890 to an incredible ]7,735,553 in 1920 (Buetow, 1970, p.
167, as cited in the Official Catholic Directory).
The rapid growth in the numbers of Catholics and their schools notwithstanding, they were not involved in federa l litigation until Pierce. At the
s.ame time, though, a small number of state cases dealt with ancillalY quesbons as, for instance, courts in New York (0 'Connor v. Hendrick, 1906), and
Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Herr, 1910) agreed that Roman Catholic
nuns cou ld not wear rel igious garb if they taught in public schoo ls.
Pierce, the first Supreme Court case implicating Roman Catholic and
other religiously affi liated non-public school s, relied on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Estab li slU11ent Clause.
~ater, on entering the modern era of its EstablislU11ent Clause jurisprudence
III Everson, the Supreme Court examined two cases that sign ificantly impacted faith-based schools and their students. In both cases, the Court re lied
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the
Establishment Clause.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary
The more far-reaching of the Supreme Court's two early cases on religion
and non-public schools was Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary (Pierce, 1925). In Pierce, the proprietors of two schools in
Oregon, a Roman Catho lic school and a secul ar school (the Hill Military
Academy), challenged a voter-approved initiative enacted in 1922, intended
to go into effect in 1926, that made public school attendance compulsory.
The law required all students who did not need what would today be described as special education between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend
public schools, unless they had already completed the eighth grade. Not
surprisingly, the proprietors of the schools quickly filed a suit cha llenging the
law as presenting a threat to the continued existence of their institutions.
After a federal trial court enjoined enforcement of the statute, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that enforcing the law would have seriously impaired, if not destroyed, the profitability of the school s whi le diminishing the value of their property. Although recognizing the power of the
state "reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise, and examine
them, their teachers and pupils .. . (Pierce, 534)," the Court focused on the
schools' property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Pierce Court grounded its judgment on the realization that the
school s sought protection fro m unreasonabl e interference with t1~ eir students
and the destruction of their business and property. The Court also decided
that while states may oversee such important features as health, safety, and
teacher qualifications relating to the operation of non-public schoo ls, they
could not do so to an extent greater than they did for public schools.
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Cochran v. Louisiana State Board o/Education
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education (Cochran, 1930) involved a
state law providing free textbooks for all students in the state, regardless of
where they attended school. A taxpayer unsuccessfully challenged the law on
the ground that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by taking private
property through taxation for a non-public purpose. As in Pierce, the Supreme Court resolved the dispute based on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the First Amendment' s Establishment
Clause.
In unanimously affmlling the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana that insofar as the students, rather than their schools, were the beneficiaries of the law, the United States Supreme Court agreed that the statute had
valid secular purpose. In so doing, the Court anticipated the Child Benefit
Test that emerged in Everson v. Board of Education (1947). As discussed
below, while the Supreme Court has consistently upheld similar textbook
provisions, as reflected in the companior! chapter state courts have struck
them down under their own more restrictive constitutions.
STATE AID TO ROMAN CATHOLIC AND OTHER
RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause perspective on state aid to K-12
education, sometimes referred to as "parochiaid," evolved through three
phases. During the first stage, beginning with Everson v. Board of Education
in 1947 and ending with Board of Education of Central School District No.1
v. Allen in 1968, the Court created the Child Benefit Test, which allows
selected f01"ms of publicly funded aid on the ground that it helps children
rather than their faith-based schools.
The span between Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971 (by far the leading case on
the Establishment Clause in educational settings, with the Supreme Court
applying it in more than thirty of its opinions), and Aguilar v. Felton in 1985
was the nadir from the perspective of supporters of the Child Benefit Test.
This period represented the low point because during this time the Court
largely refused to move beyond the limits it initiated in Everson and Allen. In
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District in 1993, the Court resun"ected
the Child Benefit Test, allowing it to enter a phase that extends through the
present day, in which more fonus of aid have been permissible.
Given this history, the remaining sections examine major Supreme Court
cases involving state aid to faith-based schools and their students, essentially
in the order in which they were litigated. These sections cover transportation,
textbooks, secular services and salary supplements, aid to parents (divided
into tuition reimbursements and income tax returns), reimbursements to
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faith-based schools (covering instructional materials and support services),
and vouchers.

Transportation
As noted, Everson v. Board of Education (1947) was the first Supreme Court
case on the merits of the Establishment Clause and education. Everson involved a law from New Jersey permitting local school boards to enter into
Contracts for student transportation.
After a local board authorized reimbursement to parents for the costs of
bus fare for sending their children to primarily Roman Catholic schools, a
taxpayer filed suit, challenging the law as unconstitutional in two respects:
first, in an approach not unlike the plaintiff's unsuccessful argument in Cochran, he alleged that the law authorized the state to take the money of some
citizens by taxation and bestow it on others for the private purpose of supporting non-public schools in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment;
second, he charged that the statute was one "respecting an establislunent of
religion," since it forced him to contribute to support church schools in
violation of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim
in Everson in interpreting the law as having a public purpose, adding that the
First Amendment did not prohibit the state from extending general benefits
to alI of its citizens without regard to their religious beliefs. The Court treated
student transportation as another category of public services such as police,
fire, and health protection.
In what became something of a Trojan Horse because of difficulties it
would create for state aid to faith-based schools, the analysis in the majority
opinion was proffered by Justice Hugo Black, a fonner member of the Ku
Klux Klan (Hamburger, 2002, p. 422). Of course, the Klan hated Catholics
along with African-Americans, Jews, among others. Black introduced the
Jeffersonian metaphor into the Court's First Amendment analysis, writing
that "[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach" (Everson, 1947, p. 18).
Following Everson, states had to choose whether to provide publicly
funded transportation to students who attend faith-based schools. As examined in the companion chapter, lower courts, relying on state constitutional
provisions, reached mixed results on this issue.
In Wolman v. Waller (Wolman, 1977), the Supreme Court considered
whether public funds could be used to provide transportation for field trips
for children who attended faith-based schools in Ohio. The Court held that
the practice was unconstitutional because insofar as field trips were oriented
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to the curriculum, they were in the category of instruction rather than that of
non-ideological secular serv ices such as transportation to and from school.

Textbooks
Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen (Allen, 1968),
another case involving textbooks, was litigated at the Supreme Court three
years after Catholic schools reached their peak enrollm ents in the United
States. In Allen, the Justices relied on the First rather than the Fourteenth,
Amendment. They essentially followed the pre~edent from Cochran in affil111ing the constitutionality of a statute from New York that required local
school boards to loan books to children in grades seven to 12 who attended
non-public schools.
The law at issue in Allen did not mandate that the books loaned to all
students had to be the same as those used in the public schools but did require
that titles be approved by local board officials before they could be adopted.
Relying largely on the Ch ild Benefit Test, the Court observed that the statute's purpose was not to aid religious or non-public schools and that its
primary effect was to improve the quality of education for all children.
Other than for the delivery of special education services to individual
students-as in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1 993)-Allen
represented the outer limit of the Chi ld Benefit Test for large groups of
children prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Agostini v. Felton (1997)
discussed below. The Justices upheld like textbook provisions in Meek v.
Pittenger (1975) and Wolman, both of which are also examined in more
detail below.

Secular Services and Salary Supplements
The Supreme Court's most important case involving the Establishment
Clause and education was Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). In Lemon, the Court
invalidated a statute from Pennsylvania calling for the purchase of secular
services and a law from Rhode Is land that provided salary supplements for
teachers in non-public schoo ls, most of which were Roman Catholic.
The Pennsylvania law directed the superintendent of education to purchase specified secular educational services from non-public schools. Officials directly reimbursed the non-public schools for their actual expenditures
for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. The superintendent had to approve the textbooks and materials, which were restricted to the
areas of mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical science, and physical education.
In Rhode Island, officials could supplement the salaries of certificated
teachers of secu lar subjects in non-public elementary schoo ls by directly
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paying them amounts not in excess of 15% of their current annual salaries;
their sa laries could not exceed the maximum paid to public school teachers.
The supplements were available to teachers in non-public schools where
average per-pupil expenditures on secular education were less than in public
~chools. In addition, the teachers had to use the same materials as were used
In public schools.
In striking down both laws, the Supreme Court enwlciated the three-part
test known as the Lemon test. In creating this measure, the Court added a
third prong to the two-part test it created in School District of Abington
!ownship v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett (J 963), companion cases dealIng with prayer and Bible reading in public schools. This third part, which
dealt with excessive entanglement, came from Walz v. Tax Commission of
New York City (1970), which upheld New York State's practice of providing
state property tax exemptions for church property that is used in worship
services.
According to the Lemon test:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over many years. Tlu-ee such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion" (Lemon, 1971 , 612-13).

As to entanglement and state aid to faith-based schools, the Court identified three other factors: "[W]e must examine the character and purposes of
the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and religious
authority" (Lemon, 1971,615).
In Lemon the Supreme Court maintained that aid for teachers' salaries
was different from secular, neutral, or non-ideological services, facilities, or
materials. Reflecting on Allen, the Court remarked that teachers have a substantially different ideological character than books. In terms of the potential
for involving faith or morals in secular subjects, the Court feared that while
the content of a textbook can be identified, how a teacher covers subject
matter is not.
The Lemon Court added that conflict can arise when teachers who work
under the direction of religious officials are faced with separating religious
and secular aspects of education. The COUlt held that the safeguards necessary to ensure that teachers avoid non-ideological perspectives give rise to
impermissible entanglement. The Court concluded that an ongoing history of
government grants to non-public schools suggests that these programs were
almost always accompanied by varying measures of control.
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Higher Education
The Supreme Court has yet to hand down a judgment directly involving
Catholic higher education. In a related development, though, on the same day
that it ruled in Lemon, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Higher
Education Facilities Act of 1963, which made construction grants available
to institutions of higher education, including church-related colleges and
lmiversities. In Tilton v. Richardson (Tilton, 1971), a case originating in
Connecticut, the Court reasoned that while the section of the law that limited
recipients' obligation not to use federally financed facilities for sectarian
instruction or religious worship for 20 years unconstitutionally allowed a
contribution of property of substantial value to religious bodies, that section
was severable.
The Supreme Court was satisfied that the remainder of the statute in
Tilton did not violate the First Amendment. In upholding the remainder of
the statute, the Justices distinguished Tilton from Lemon insofar as in Tilton,
indoctrination was not a substantial purpose or activity of church-related
colleges because the student body was not composed of impressionable children, the aid was non-ideological, and there was no excessive entanglement
since the grants were one-time and single-purpose.
Two years later, in Hunt v. McNair (1973), the Supreme Court decided
that insofar as religion was not pervasive in an institution, South Carolina
was free to issue revenue bonds to benefit the church-related college. The
Court was satisfied that this arrangement was acceptable because the bonds
were not guaranteed by public funds.

Aids to Parents

Tuition Reimbursement
Two months after Lemon, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute that
allowed parents whose children attended non-public schools to request tuition reimbursement. The same parent as in Lemon challenged the new law as
having the primary effect of advancing religion.
In Sloan v. Lemon (Sloan, 1973) the Supreme Court affIrmed that the law
impermissibly singled out a class of citizens for a special economic benefit.
The Justices viewed this as unlike the "indirect" and "incidental" benefits
that flowed to religious schools from programs that aided all parents by
supplying bus transportation and secular textbooks for their children. The
Court commented that transportation and textbooks were carefully restricted
to the purely secular side of church-affiliated schools and did not provide
special aid to their students.
The Supreme Court expanded on Sloan's analysis in a case from New
York, Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (Ny-
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qUist, 1973). The Court ruled that even though the grants went to parents
rather than to school officials, this did not compel a different result. The
Court explained that since parents would have used the money to pay for
tuition and the law failed to separate secular from religious uses, the effect of
the aid unmistakably would have provided the desired financial support for
non-pUblic schools.
In so doing, the Nyquist Court rejected the state's argument that parents
Were not simply conduits because they were free to spend the money in any
malU1er they chose since they paid the tuition and the law merely provided
for reimbursements. The Court indicated that even if the grants were offered
a~ incentives to have parents send their children to religious schools, the law
Violated the Establishment Clause regardless of whether the money made its
Way into the coffers of the religious institutions.

Income Tax
Another section of the same New York statute in Ny quist aided parents via
income tax benefits. Under the law, parents of children who attended I)onpublic schools were entitled to income tax deductions as long as they did not
receiVe tuition reimbursements under the other part of the statute. The Supreme Court invalidated this provision in pointing out that in practical terms
there was little difference, for purposes of evaluating whether such aid had
the effect of advancing religion, between a tax benefit and a tuition grant.
!he Court based its judgment on the notion that under both programs qualIfying parents received the same form of encouragement and reward for
Sending their children to non-pUblic schools.
In Mueller v. Allen (Mueller, 1983), the Supreme Court upheld a statute
from Minnesota that granted all parents state income tax deductions for the
actual costs of tuition, textbooks, and transportation associated with sending
their children to K-12 schools. The law afforded all parents deductions of
$500 for children in grades K- 6 and $700 for those in grades 7- 12.
The Justices distinguished Mueller from Ny quist primarily because the
tax benefit was available to all parents, not only those whose children were in
non-public schools. The Court also recognized that the deduction was one
among many rather than a single, favored type of taxpayer expense.
Acknowledging the legislature'S broad latitude to create classifications
a~d distinctions in tax statutes, and that the state benefited from the scheme
Since it promoted an educated citizenry while reducing the costs of public
education, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the law met all three of
Lemon' s prongs. The Court paid little attention to the fact that since the
state's public schools were essentially free, the expenses of parents whose
Children attended them were at most minima l and that about 96% of taxpayers who benefited had children enrolled in religious schools.

1--
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Reimbursements to Faith-Based Schools
On the same day that it resolved Nyquis.t, in a second case from New York,
the Supreme Court applied basically the same rationale in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty (Levitt, 1973). Here the Court
invalidated a law allowing the state to reimburse non-public schools for
expenses incurred while administering and reporting test results as well as
other records. Insofar as there were no restrictions on the use of the founds,
such that teacher-prepared tests on religious subject matter were seemingly
reimbursable, the Court observed that the aid had the primary effect of advancing religious education because there were insufficient safeguards in
place to regulate how the monies were spent.
Wolman v. Walter (1977), a case from Ohio, saw the Supreme Court
uphold a law pem1itting reimbursement for religious schools where officials
used standardized tests and scoring services to evaluate student progress. The
Justices distinguished these tests from the ones in Levitt since the latter were
neither drafted nor scored by non-public school personnel. The Court also
reasoned that the law did not authorize payments to church-sponsored
schools for costs associated with administering the tests.
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan (1980,
Regan) the Supreme Court reexamined another aspect of Levitt after the New
York State legislature modified the law. Under its new provisions, the statute
provided reimbursements to non-public schools for the actual costs of complying with state requirements for reporting on students and for administering mandatory and optional state-prepared examinations. Unlike the law in
Ohio, this statute permitted the tests to be graded by personnel in the nonpublic schools that were, in tum, reimbursed for these services. The law also
created accounting procedures to monitor reimbursements.
The Regan Court conceded that the differences between the statutes were
permissible, since scoring of essentially objective tests and recording their
results along with attendance data offered no significant opportunity for religious indoctrination while serving secular state educational purposes. The
Court concluded that the accounting method did not create excessive entanglement since the reimbursements were equal to the achlal costs.

Instructional Materials
In Meek v. Pittenger (1975 , Meek), the Supreme Court examined the legality
of loans of instructional materials, including textbooks and equipment, to
faith-based schools in Pennsylvania. Although the Court upheld the loan of
textbooks, it struck down parts of the law on periodicals, films, recordings,
and laboratory equipment as well as equipment for recording and projecting;
the statute had the primary effect of advancing religion due to the predominantly religious character of participating schools.
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The Meek Court was concemed because the only statutory requirement
imposed on the schools to qualify for the loans was directing their cunicula
to offer the subjects and activities mandated by the commonwealth's board
of education. The Court thought that because the church-related scl~ools were
the primary beneficiaries, the massive aid to their educational functIon necessarily resulted in aid to their sectarian enterprises as a whole.
The Supreme Court reached sim ilar results in Wolman v. Walter (Wolman, 1977), upholding a statute from Ohio which specified that textbook
loans were to be made to students or their parents, rather than directly to their
non-public schools. The Justices struck down a provision that wou ld have
allowed loans of instructional equipment including projectors, tape recorders,
~'ecord players, maps and globes, and science kits. Echoing Meek, the Court
lllvalidated the statute's authorization of the loans in light of its fear that
i~sofar as it would be impossible to separate the secu lar and .sectarian ~nc
hons for which these items were being used, the aid inevItably provIded
support for the religious roles of the schools.
Mitchell v. Helms (Helms, 2000), a Supreme Court case originating in
Louisiana, expanded the bOlmdaries of permissible aid to faith-based schools
(Mawdsley & Russo, 2001). A plurality upheld the constitutionality of ch~p
ter 2 of T itle I-now Title VI-of the Elementary and Secondary EducatIon
~ct (2014), a federal law that permits the loans of instructiona l materials
lllciuding library books, computers, television sets, tape recorders, and maps
to non-public schools.
In Helms, the Supreme Court relied on the modified Lemon test enunciated in Agostini v. Felton, discussed below, by reviewing on ly its first two
parts while recasting entanglement as one criterion in evaluating a statute's
effect. Insofar as the purpose part of the test was not cha ll enged, the plurality
on ly considered chapter 2's effect. They concluded that it did not foster
impermissible indoctrination because aid was allocated pursuant to neutral
secular criteria that neither favored nor disfavored religion and was available
to all schools based on secu lar, nondiscriminatory grounds. In its rationale,
the plurality explicitly reversed those parts of Meek and Wolman that were
inconsistent with its analysis on loans of instructiona l materials.

Support Services
In Meek v. Pittenger (1975), the Supreme Court invalidated a Pennsy lvania
law permitting public school personnel to provide auxiliary services on-site
in faith-based schools. At the same time, the Court forbade the delivery of
remedial and accelerated instructional programs, guidance counseling and
testing, and services to aid children who were educationally disadvantaged.
The Court asserted that it was immaterial that the students would have received remedial , rather than advanced, work; the required survei ll ance to
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ensure the absence of ideology would have given rise to excessive entanglement between church and state.
Wolman v. Walter (1977) saw the Supreme Court reach mixed results on
aid. In addition to upholding the textbook loan program, the Court allowed
Ohio to supply non-public schools with state-mandated tests while allowing
public school employees to go on-site to perfonn diagnostic tests to evaluate
whether students needed speech, hearing, and psychological services. The
Court also allowed public funds to be spent providing therapeutic services to
students fro m non-public schools as long as they were delivered off-site. The
Court fo rbade state officials from loaning instructional materials and equipment to schools or from using funds to pay for field trips for students in nonpublic schools.
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District (Zobrest) was a harbinger of change to come in its Estab lishment Clause jurisprudence. At issue was a school board in Arizona's refusal
to provide a sign language interpreter for a student who was deaf, under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, after he transferred into a Roman Catholic high school. In a suit filed as the student entered high school
but which was resolved shortly after he graduated, the Court found that an
interpreter provided neutral aid to him without offering financial benefits to
his parents or school, and that there was no governmental participation in the
instruction because the interpreter was only a conduit to effectuate his communications.
The Zobrest Court relied in part on Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind (1986), wherein it upheld the constitutionality of extending a general vocational assistance program to a blind man who was
studying to become a clergyman at a religious college. Yet the Supreme
Court of Washington later interpreted its state constitution as forb idding such
use of public funds, and the Supreme Court refused to hear a f·urther appeal
(Witters v. State Commission for the Blind, 1989).
A year later, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District
v. Grumet (1994), the Supreme Court reviewed a case where the New York
State Legislature enacted a statute creating a school district with the same
boundaries as an Orthodox Jewish community. The legislature created the
district in seeking to accommodate the needs of parents of children with
disabilities who wished to send them to a nearby school that would have
honored their religious customs and beliefs, particularly with regard to dietary practices.
On fu.rther review of state court orders invalidating the law, the Court
affirmed that it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court maintained that
while a state may accommodate a group's religious needs by seeking to
reduce or eliminate special burdens, it went too far. Instead, the COUJ1 sug-
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After the Sixth Circuit invalidated the plan, in School Dlstrzct of Clty of
Grand Rapids v. Ball (Ball, 1985) the Supreme Court affirmed that the
released time program was unconsti;utional because it failed all t1u'ee prongs
of the Lemon test.
On the same day that it resolved Ball, in a more far-reachi.ng case, the
SUpreme COUlt reviewed a dispute from New York City. In Agudar v. Felton
(Aguilar, 1985), the Justices considered whether public school teachers could
provide remedial instruction under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (1 965)-enacted the same year as Gravissimum Educ~tionis was promulgated-in religiously affi liated non-public schoo ls. The
TItle I provision of the Act, whi ch passed with considerable suppo~t from
Catholic leaders in particular (Buetow, 1970), was designed for ~pe~lficall~
targeted chi ldren, who were educationa lly disadvantaged, on-sIte \l1 theIr
faith-based schools.
In Aguilar v. Felton (Aguilar, 1985), the Supreme Court affirmed earlier
?rders that the program permitting the on-site delivery of services to chi ldren
\l1 their religiously affiliated non-public schools, the vast majority of which
were Roman Catholic, was unconstitutional. Even though the New York City
Board of Education (NYCBOE) developed safeguards to ensure that public
funds were not spent for religious purposes, the Court struck the program
down based on the fear that a monitoring system to have avoided the creation
of an impennissible relationship between Church and state might have resulted in the presence of excessive entanglement under the third prong of the
Lemon test.
Twelve years later, in Agostini v. Felton (Agostini, 1997), the Supreme
Court took the unusual step of dissolving the injunction that it upheld in
Aguilar (Russo & Osborne, 1997). The Court reasoned that the Title I program did not violate the Lemon test since there was no governmenta l indoctrination, there were no differences between recipients based on religion, and
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there was no excessive entanglement. The Court thus ruled that a federally
funded program that provides supplemental, remedial instruction and counseling services to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is not invalid
under the Establishment Clause when the assistance is provided on-site in
faith-based schools pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as
those that the NYCBOE implemented. Perhaps the most important outcome
in Agostini was the Court's having modified the Lemon test by reviewing
only its first two prongs, purpose and effect, while recasting entanglement as
one criterion in evaluating a statute's effect.

Vouchers
Considerable controversy has arisen over the use of vouchers, with courts
reaching mixed results in disputes over their constitutionality. Still, the only
Supreme Court case on vouchers arose in Ohio. The Ohio General Assembly,
acting pursuant to a desegregation order, enacted the Ohio Pilot Project
Scholarship Program (OPPSP) to assist children in Cleveland's failing public
schools. The main goal of the OPPSP was to permit an equal number of
students to receive vouchers and tutorial assistance grants while attending
regular public schools. Another part of the law provided greater choices to
parents and children via the creation of community, or charter, schools and
magnet schools. A third section featured tutorial assistance for children.
The Supreme Court 6fOhio upheld the OPPSP but severed the part of the
law affording priority to parents who belonged to a religious group supporting a sectarian institution (Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 1999). Moreover, in
finding that the OPPSP violated the state constitutional requirement that
every statute have only one subject, the court struck it down. Still, when the
court stayed enforcement of its order to avoid disrupting the then-current
school year, the Ohio General Assembly quickly reenacted a revised statute.
After lower federal courts, relying largely on Nyquist (1973), enjoined the
operation of the revised statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (Zelman, 2002), the Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and upheld
the constitutionality of the OPPSP (Russo & Mawdsley, 2002).
Relying on Agostini, the Zelman Court began by conceding the lack of a
dispute over the program's valid secular purpose in providing programming
for poor children in a failing school system. The Court examined whether it
had the forbidden effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. The Court upheld the voucher program because as part of the state's far-reaching attempt
to provide greater educational opporhmities in a failing school system, the
law allocated aid on the basis of neutral secular criteria that neither favored
nor disfavored religion, was made available to both religious and secular
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis, and offered assistance directly to
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a broad class of citizens who directed the aid to religious schools based
entirely on their own genuine and independent private choices.
. .
The Zelman Court was not concerned by the fact that most of t!1e p~tICI
pating schools were faith-based because parents chose to send their ch~ldren
to them insofar as surrounding public schools refused to take part I.n the
program. If anything, the Court acknowledged that most of the .chlldren
attended the religiously affiliated non-public schools, most of which were
Roman Catholic, not as a matter of law but because they were unwelcomed
in the public schools. The Court concluded that insofar as it was following an
unbroken line of its own precedent supporting true private par~nta.l ~hoice
~hat provided benefits directly to a wide range of needy private mdlvlduals,
Its only choice was to uphold the voucher program.

CONCLUSION
Roman Catholic schoo ls clearly have the legal right to operate but face an
increasingly uncertain futme in the face of declining enrollments due to a
variety of factors beyond the scope of this chapter. Even so, as with most
issues involving the law, the one thing to be sure of is that litigation will
continue over the status of aid to Catholic schools, their students, and parents.
The extent to which aid may be available to Catholic schools of all levels
depends on a combination of legislative action and judicial interpretation by
the Supreme Court which, as demonstrated, has gone through three distinct
periods of greater or lesser support for the schools. Whether the Court is
willing to continue to support aid to Roman Catholic and other religiously
affi liated non-public schools bears constant watching.
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